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<title><![CDATA[ ParaCyberBellum Security Review ]]></title>
<description><![CDATA[ Cybersecurity technical stuff on the fly ]]></description>
<link>https://library.paracyberbellum.io/rss</link>
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<language>en</language>
<pubDate>Fri, 10 Apr 2026 04:06:46 +0000</pubDate>
<item>
<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] Mutation XSS in a Mail Application via DOMPurify Misconfiguration and CKEditor CDATA Parsing Bug ]]></title>
<link>https://sudistark.github.io/2026/04/07/mxss.html</link>
<guid>https://sudistark.github.io/2026/04/07/mxss.html</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 10 Apr 2026 03:59:51 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Application Security - Exploits & Payloads ] I found a mutation XSS chain in a webmail client by exploiting a mis‑configured DOMPurify and an old CKEditor 4 CDATA‑parsing flaw that lets a <style><![CDATA[…<img onerror=…]>…]]></style> payload execute after DOMPurify’s multiple sanitization rounds, giving full script execution in the victim's browser. ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ Sudi ]]></author>
</item>
<item>
<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] IAM the Captain Now - Hijacking Azure Identity Access ]]></title>
<link>https://trustedsec.com/blog/iam-the-captain-now-hijacking-azure-identity-access</link>
<guid>https://trustedsec.com/blog/iam-the-captain-now-hijacking-azure-identity-access</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 10 Apr 2026 03:53:49 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Public Cloud - Privilege Escalation ] Diving in depth into Identity and Access Management (IAM) within Microsoft Azure, I show how IAM permissions can be abused within an Azure environment. ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ Justin Mahon ]]></author>
</item>
<item>
<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] React2DoS (CVE-2026-23869): When the Flight Protocol Crashes at Takeoff ]]></title>
<link>https://www.imperva.com/blog/react2dos-cve-2026-23869-when-the-flight-protocol-crashes-at-takeoff/</link>
<guid>https://www.imperva.com/blog/react2dos-cve-2026-23869-when-the-flight-protocol-crashes-at-takeoff/</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 10 Apr 2026 03:49:59 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Exploits & Payloads ] We disclose an unauthenticated remote denial‑of‑service vulnerability we identified and reported in React Server Components that we've dubbed "React2DoS".  We analyze its impact and place it in the broader context of recently found Flight protocol vulnerabilities, especially CVE‑2026‑23864. ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ Yohann Sillam ]]></author>
</item>
<item>
<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] Illuminating VoidLink: Technical analysis of the VoidLink rootkit framework ]]></title>
<link>https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/illuminating-voidlink</link>
<guid>https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/illuminating-voidlink</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 10 Apr 2026 03:47:45 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Malware Analysis ] We analyze VoidLink, a sophisticated Linux malware framework that combines traditional Loadable Kernel Modules with eBPF to maintain persistence. ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ Remco Sprooten, Ruben Groenewoud ]]></author>
</item>
<item>
<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] Critical Vulnerability in Unstructured.io (CVE-2025–64712) ]]></title>
<link>https://www.cyera.com/research/inside-destructured---critical-vulnerability-in-unstructured-io-cve-2025-64712</link>
<guid>https://www.cyera.com/research/inside-destructured---critical-vulnerability-in-unstructured-io-cve-2025-64712</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 10 Apr 2026 03:34:54 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Exploits & Payloads ] We discovered a critical vulnerability (CVE-2025-64712) in Unstructured.io. The flaw enables arbitrary file write and potentially full remote code execution on the machine running the library. ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ Dor Attias ]]></author>
</item>
<item>
<title><![CDATA[ [TOOL] Sandboxec ]]></title>
<link>https://github.com/sandboxec/sandboxec</link>
<guid>https://github.com/sandboxec/sandboxec</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 10 Apr 2026 03:32:48 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Virtualization ] A lightweight command sandbox for Linux, secure-by-default, built on Landlock. ]]></description>
</item>
<item>
<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] Joomla! Novarain/Tassos Framework Vulnerabilities ]]></title>
<link>https://ssd-disclosure.com/joomla-novarain-tassos-framework-vulnerabilities/</link>
<guid>https://ssd-disclosure.com/joomla-novarain-tassos-framework-vulnerabilities/</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 10 Apr 2026 03:31:23 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Exploits & Payloads ] We found three critical primitives – unauthenticated file read, unauthenticated file deletion, and SQL injection leading to arbitrary database read – across five widely deployed Joomla! extensions. Chained together, these flaws enable reliable remote code execution (RCE) and administrator account takeover on unpatched Joomla! instance. ]]></description>
</item>
<item>
<title><![CDATA[ [TOOL] AI Scanner ]]></title>
<link>https://github.com/0din-ai/ai-scanner</link>
<guid>https://github.com/0din-ai/ai-scanner</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 10 Apr 2026 03:23:14 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Machine Learning & AI - Vulnerability Analysis & Scanning ] AI model safety scanner built on NVIDIA garak ]]></description>
</item>
<item>
<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] Spooler Alert: Remote Unauth'd RCE-to-root Chain in CUPS ]]></title>
<link>https://heyitsas.im/posts/cups/</link>
<guid>https://heyitsas.im/posts/cups/</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 09 Apr 2026 08:36:01 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Exploits & Payloads ] I discovered two issues in CUPS, CVE-2026-34980 and CVE-2026-34990, chainable into unauthenticated remote attacker -> unprivileged RCE -> root file (over)write. ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ Asim Viladi Oglu Manizada ]]></author>
</item>
<item>
<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] New Lua-based malware "LucidRook" observed ]]></title>
<link>https://blog.talosintelligence.com/new-lua-based-malware-lucidrook/</link>
<guid>https://blog.talosintelligence.com/new-lua-based-malware-lucidrook/</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 09 Apr 2026 08:06:55 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Malware Analysis ] "LucidRook" is a sophisticated stager that embeds a Lua interpreter and Rust-compiled libraries within a dynamic-link library (DLL) to download and execute staged Lua bytecode payloads. The dropper "LucidPawn" uses region-specific anti-analysis checks and executes only in Traditional Chinese language environments associated with Taiwan.  ]]></description>
</item>
<item>
<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] Claude & Control: An Introduction to Agentic C2 with Computer Use Agents ]]></title>
<link>https://www.beyondtrust.com/blog/entry/claude-control-agentic-c2-computer-use-agent</link>
<guid>https://www.beyondtrust.com/blog/entry/claude-control-agentic-c2-computer-use-agent</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 09 Apr 2026 08:04:54 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Machine Learning & AI - C2 & Exfiltration ] This blog explores how computer use agents can be used to build an agentic command-and-control framework. By combining LLM reasoning with desktop interaction tools, attackers could automate endpoint control while blending into normal system behavior. Here, we break down the architecture, abuse scenarios, and detection opportunities. ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ Ryan Hausknecht ]]></author>
</item>
<item>
<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] Node.js Trust Falls: Dangerous Module Resolution on Windows ]]></title>
<link>https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2026/4/8/nodejs-trust-falls-dangerous-module-resolution-on-windows</link>
<guid>https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2026/4/8/nodejs-trust-falls-dangerous-module-resolution-on-windows</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 09 Apr 2026 07:52:04 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Exploits & Payloads - Privilege Escalation ] When Node.js resolves modules, the runtime searches for packages in C:\node_modules as part of its default behavior. Since low-privileged Windows users can create this directory and plant malicious modules there, any Node.js application with missing or optional dependencies becomes vulnerable to privilege escalation. ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ Bobby Gould, Michael DePlante ]]></author>
</item>
<item>
<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] Microsoft Speech ]]></title>
<link>https://ipurple.team/2026/04/07/microsoft-speech/</link>
<guid>https://ipurple.team/2026/04/07/microsoft-speech/</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 09 Apr 2026 07:48:57 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Post-Exploitation & Lateral Movement ] SpeechRuntime is a legitimate Windows component that supports Microsoft's speech-related capabilities. However, threat actors with elevated privileges can move laterally by executing code under the context of the user that has an interactive session on the target host. ]]></description>
</item>
<item>
<title><![CDATA[ [TOOL] DNSight ]]></title>
<link>https://github.com/dnsight/dnsight</link>
<guid>https://github.com/dnsight/dnsight</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 09 Apr 2026 07:45:55 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ DNS ] DNSight - the comprehensive SDK and CLI tool for DNS, email and web security hygiene. It is a Python SDK and CLI for auditing DNS, email authentication (SPF, DKIM, DMARC), and related signals. Use it from the shell or import it in your own tooling. ]]></description>
</item>
<item>
<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] From Code to Coverage - Part 5A: When All Your Detections Fail: The ADWS Blind Spot ]]></title>
<link>https://www.huntress.com/blog/ldap-active-directory-detection-part-5a</link>
<guid>https://www.huntress.com/blog/ldap-active-directory-detection-part-5a</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 09 Apr 2026 07:43:06 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Incident Response & Forensics ] We analyze how a threat actor enumerated our entire AD with Get-ADComputer, and none of our detections fired. The problem wasn't their evasion - it was an architectural blind spot in how PowerShell talks to Active Directory. ]]></description>
</item>
<item>
<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] From Code to Coverage - Part 4: The (!FALSE) Pattern ]]></title>
<link>https://www.huntress.com/blog/ldap-active-directory-detection-part-four</link>
<guid>https://www.huntress.com/blog/ldap-active-directory-detection-part-four</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 09 Apr 2026 07:41:42 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Incident Response & Forensics ] SOAPHound's LDAP query (!soaphound=*) never appears in Event 1644 logs, but it transforms into (! (FALSE)) through LDAP optimization. Understanding this transformation reveals a unique detection signature that most defenders have never seen. ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ Andrew Schwartz ]]></author>
</item>
<item>
<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] From Code to Coverage - Part 3: SDFlags ]]></title>
<link>https://www.huntress.com/blog/ldap-active-directory-detection-part-three</link>
<guid>https://www.huntress.com/blog/ldap-active-directory-detection-part-three</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 09 Apr 2026 07:39:48 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Incident Response & Forensics ] We introduce SDFlags (Security Descriptor Flags) - a hidden LDAP parameter that changes how Domain Controllers process and log queries, allowing attackers to enumerate permissions while evading signature-based detection. ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ Andrew Schwartz ]]></author>
</item>
<item>
<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] Common Entra ID Security Assessment Findings - Part 3: Weak Privileged Identity Management Configuration ]]></title>
<link>https://blog.compass-security.com/2026/04/common-entra-id-security-assessment-findings-part-3-weak-privileged-identity-management-configuration/</link>
<guid>https://blog.compass-security.com/2026/04/common-entra-id-security-assessment-findings-part-3-weak-privileged-identity-management-configuration/</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 09 Apr 2026 07:36:50 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Active Directory - Public Cloud - Privilege Escalation ] A review of common misconfigurations of Microsoft Entra ID Privileged Identity Management, such as not using PIM, leaving high‑privilege roles permanently assigned, relying only on built‑in MFA, allowing long activation windows, and lacking approvals/notifications - that can let attackers hijack privileged access. ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ Christian Feutcher ]]></author>
</item>
<item>
<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] Guardrail Sandbox Escape in LiteLLM ]]></title>
<link>https://www.x41-dsec.de/lab/advisories/x41-2026-001-litellm/</link>
<guid>https://www.x41-dsec.de/lab/advisories/x41-2026-001-litellm/</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 09 Apr 2026 07:15:15 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Exploits & Payloads - Machine Learning & AI ] The LiteLLM proxy exposes a /guardrails/test_custom_code API endpoint that allows authenticated users to submit arbitrary Python code for guardrail testing. The endpoint attempts to restrict dangerous operations using regex-based source code filtering, but this can be bypassed using bytecode rewriting techniques to achieve arbitrary code execution on the server. ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ Markus Vervier ]]></author>
</item>
<item>
<title><![CDATA[ [TOOL] TotalRecall ]]></title>
<link>https://github.com/xaitax/TotalRecall</link>
<guid>https://github.com/xaitax/TotalRecall</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 09 Apr 2026 07:13:09 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Data Gathering & OSINT ] This tool extracts and displays data from the Recall feature in Windows 11, providing an easy way to access information about your PC's activity snapshots. ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ Alex Hagenah ]]></author>
</item>
<item>
<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] Open-source testing: the Bug Bounty guide to code analysis ]]></title>
<link>https://www.yeswehack.com/fr/learn-bug-bounty/open-source-guide-code-analysis</link>
<guid>https://www.yeswehack.com/fr/learn-bug-bounty/open-source-guide-code-analysis</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 08 Apr 2026 07:23:35 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Code Analysis ] We explore advanced code analysis techniques such as taint analysis, CodeQL queries and dynamic validation, demonstrated against a real target. ]]></description>
</item>
<item>
<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] Building a Detection Foundation - Part 5: Correlation in Practice ]]></title>
<link>https://trustedsec.com/blog/building-a-detection-foundation-part-5-correlation-in-practice</link>
<guid>https://trustedsec.com/blog/building-a-detection-foundation-part-5-correlation-in-practice</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 08 Apr 2026 07:20:37 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Incident Response & Forensics ] At the heart of Windows forensics and detection is a simple concept: every action happens in a context. That context is defined by Who, What, When, Where and How. Our logging foundation captures each of these elements across multiple event sources. The art is correlating them. ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ Carlos Perez ]]></author>
</item>
<item>
<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] Reversing the FT100 BLE Fitness Bracelet ]]></title>
<link>https://lessonsec.com/posts/reversing_the_ft100_ble_fitness_bracelet/</link>
<guid>https://lessonsec.com/posts/reversing_the_ft100_ble_fitness_bracelet/</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 08 Apr 2026 07:13:20 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ IoT & ICS - Bluetooth ] We detail how to intercept, analyze and reverse engineer the BLE protocol used by the FT100 BLE Fitness Bracelet. ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ Matteo Cosentino ]]></author>
</item>
<item>
<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] Remus: Unmasking The 64-bit Variant of the Infamous Lumma Stealer ]]></title>
<link>https://www.gendigital.com/blog/insights/research/remus-64bit-variant-of-lumma-stealer</link>
<guid>https://www.gendigital.com/blog/insights/research/remus-64bit-variant-of-lumma-stealer</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 08 Apr 2026 07:10:42 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Malware Analysis ] We identified Remus, a new 64-bit infostealer from the Lumma Stealer family.
We detail the compelling evidence tying Remus to Lumma across multiple dimensions and describe a previously undocumented Application-Bound Encryption bypass employed specifically by Remus and Lumma. ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ Vojtech Krejsa, Jan Rubin ]]></author>
</item>
<item>
<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] The Race to Ship AI Tools Left Security Behind - Part 1: Sandbox Escape ]]></title>
<link>https://cymulate.com/blog/the-race-to-ship-ai-tools-left-security-behind-part-1-sandbox-escape/</link>
<guid>https://cymulate.com/blog/the-race-to-ship-ai-tools-left-security-behind-part-1-sandbox-escape/</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 08 Apr 2026 07:08:34 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Machine Learning & AI ] We identified a recurring vulnerability class across multiple AI CLI tools that allows an attacker to escape the agent's sandbox and execute code on the host system with the user's privileges. Instead of breaking the sandbox through the operating system or container runtime, the attacks abuse the agent's own configuration, startup behavior and trust boundaries.  ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ Ilan Kalendarov, Ben Zamir, Elad Beber ]]></author>
</item>
<item>
<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] CVE-2026-34197 ActiveMQ RCE via Jolokia API ]]></title>
<link>https://horizon3.ai/attack-research/disclosures/cve-2026-34197-activemq-rce-jolokia/</link>
<guid>https://horizon3.ai/attack-research/disclosures/cve-2026-34197-activemq-rce-jolokia/</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 08 Apr 2026 06:57:21 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Exploits & Payloads ] CVE-2026-34197 is an ActiveMQ RCE flaw exploiting Jolokia to execute remote commands. The vulnerability requires credentials, but default credentials (admin:admin) are common in many environments. ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ Naveen Sunkavally ]]></author>
</item>
<item>
<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] AgentEscape: How MCP Servers Let AI Agents Read Your Private Keys ]]></title>
<link>https://spiderrating.com/blog/agent-escape-mcp-servers-leak-your-secrets</link>
<guid>https://spiderrating.com/blog/agent-escape-mcp-servers-leak-your-secrets</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 08 Apr 2026 06:41:46 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Machine Learning & AI - Credentials Dumps, Theft and Cracking ] A path traversal vulnerability in context7allowed any connected AI agent to read arbitrary files from the host machine - including SSH keys, .env secrets, and database credentials. ]]></description>
</item>
<item>
<title><![CDATA[ [TOOL] Supply Chain Monitor ]]></title>
<link>https://github.com/elastic/supply-chain-monitor</link>
<guid>https://github.com/elastic/supply-chain-monitor</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 07 Apr 2026 04:09:08 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ DevOps - Code Analysis ] Automated monitoring of the top PyPI and npm packages for supply chain compromise. Polls both registries for new releases, diffs each release against its predecessor, and uses an LLM (via Cursor Agent CLI) to classify diffs as benign or malicious. Malicious findings trigger a Slack alert. ]]></description>
</item>
<item>
<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] Cracking a Malvertising DGA From the Device Side ]]></title>
<link>https://www.buchodi.com/cracking-a-malvertising-dga-from-the-device-side/</link>
<guid>https://www.buchodi.com/cracking-a-malvertising-dga-from-the-device-side/</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 07 Apr 2026 04:01:26 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ DNS - Malware Analysis ] I cracked the algorithm that generates dynamic malicious domains. Using application-layer traffic from mobile devices, I recovered the full domain generation algorithm (DGA), validated it against every domain observed in the wild, and can now predict every future domain before it's registered. ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ Buchodi ]]></author>
</item>
<item>
<title><![CDATA[ [TOOL] PoisonKiller ]]></title>
<link>https://github.com/j3h4ck/PoisonKiller</link>
<guid>https://github.com/j3h4ck/PoisonKiller</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 07 Apr 2026 03:48:23 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Obfuscation, Evasion & LoL ] POC for a kernel-mode process killer discovered during BYOVD research. Uses a signed Microsoft driver (PoisonX.sys) that exposes an IOCTL interface capable of terminating any process including PPL-protected EDR services like CrowdStrike Falcon. ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ j3h4ck ]]></author>
</item>
<item>
<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] VMware Guest To Host ]]></title>
<link>https://r0keb.github.io/posts/VMware-Guest-To-Host/</link>
<guid>https://r0keb.github.io/posts/VMware-Guest-To-Host/</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 07 Apr 2026 03:47:34 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Exploits & Payloads - Virtualization ] In this article we're going to walk through the complete process of creating a Guest-to-Host exploit in VMware. The exploitation process will chain a memory leak for bypassing ASLR and obtaining the base address of vmware_vmx and an RCE triggered with a stack-based buffer overflow in the Service Discovery Protocol (SDP). ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ r0keb ]]></author>
</item>
<item>
<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] Building an Automated Pipeline with LangChain DeepAgents to Find Zero-Days in Kernel Drivers. ]]></title>
<link>https://blog.ahmadz.ai/automated-deepagents-langchain-pipeline-for-zero-days/</link>
<guid>https://blog.ahmadz.ai/automated-deepagents-langchain-pipeline-for-zero-days/</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 07 Apr 2026 03:42:42 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Machine Learning & AI - Reverse Engineering - Tooling ] I built an automated pipeline that scans thousands of Windows kernel drivers for exploitable vulnerabilities, specifically looking for ones that can be used in BYOVD (Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver) attacks. On its first real run on a massive driver pack, it successfully flagged a zero-day in an ASUS driver. ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ Rehman Ahmadzai ]]></author>
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<item>
<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] Remote code execution in CentOS Web Panel - CVE-2025-70951 ]]></title>
<link>https://fenrisk.com/rce-centos-webpanel-2</link>
<guid>https://fenrisk.com/rce-centos-webpanel-2</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 06 Apr 2026 05:10:20 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Exploits & Payloads ] We detail CVE-2025-70951, a vulnerability in Control Web Panel (CWP) allowing an unauthenticated remote attacker to execute arbitrary commands on any exposed instance - with the prerequisite of knowing a valid username. ]]></description>
</item>
<item>
<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] Escalating Privileges via AWS CodeConnections - Part 2: AWS CodeBuild ]]></title>
<link>https://thomaspreece.com/2026/03/23/part-2-aws-codebuild-escalating-privileges-via-aws-codeconnections/</link>
<guid>https://thomaspreece.com/2026/03/23/part-2-aws-codebuild-escalating-privileges-via-aws-codeconnections/</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 06 Apr 2026 05:02:01 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Privilege Escalation - Public Cloud ] From an unprivileged CodeBuild job using CodeConnections you can hit an undocumented API to retrieve the raw GitHub App token or BitBucket JWT App token CodeConnections uses. These tokens can be used directly against GitHub/BitBucket APIs and have the full permissions of the CodeConnection App you installed into your GitHub/BitBucket. ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ Thomas Preece ]]></author>
</item>
<item>
<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] Escalating Privileges via AWS CodeConnections - Part 1: Overview of AWS CodeConnections ]]></title>
<link>https://thomaspreece.com/2025/12/04/part-1-overview-of-aws-codeconnections-escalating-privileges-via-aws-codeconnections/</link>
<guid>https://thomaspreece.com/2025/12/04/part-1-overview-of-aws-codeconnections-escalating-privileges-via-aws-codeconnections/</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 06 Apr 2026 04:59:14 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Privilege Escalation - Public Cloud ] We dive into AWS CodeConnections (formally called CodeStar Connections), a feature in AWS which allows AWS resources such as AWS CodePipeline to connect to external code repositories. This is often useful for services in AWS which help you build, test and deploy your code and avoids the need for you to store secrets that grant access to your source code repository. ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ Thomas Preece ]]></author>
</item>
<item>
<title><![CDATA[ [TOOL] Leetha ]]></title>
<link>https://github.com/tjnull/leetha</link>
<guid>https://github.com/tjnull/leetha</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 06 Apr 2026 04:40:35 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Fingerprinting - Network & WiFi - Enumeration, Reconnaissance & Scanning ] Leetha identifies devices on your network by analyzing broadcast traffic and protocol exchanges - combining passive observation with active service probing to build a comprehensive device inventory, detect anomalies, and map your attack surface. ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ tjnull ]]></author>
</item>
<item>
<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] Catching Mac OS stealers in the wild ]]></title>
<link>https://cmdresearch.bearblog.dev/catching-mac-os-stealers-in-the-wild/</link>
<guid>https://cmdresearch.bearblog.dev/catching-mac-os-stealers-in-the-wild/</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 06 Apr 2026 04:37:06 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Malware Analysis ] Technical analysis of a ClickFix macOS stealer sample, probably related to AMOS Stealer. ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ Pablo Redondo Castro ]]></author>
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<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] Inside TeamPCP's Shell Arsenal ]]></title>
<link>https://theravenfile.com/2026/04/02/inside-teampcps-shell-arsenal/</link>
<guid>https://theravenfile.com/2026/04/02/inside-teampcps-shell-arsenal/</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 06 Apr 2026 04:32:21 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Threat Hunting ] This article focuses exclusively on the Shells used by TeamPCP in various campaigns that resulted in the massive Supply Chain Attacks. ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ RakeshKrish ]]></author>
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<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] Homoglyph Attacks: How Lookalike Characters Fuel Cyber Deception ]]></title>
<link>https://www.seqrite.com/blog/homoglyph-attacks-lookalike-characters-cyber-deception/</link>
<guid>https://www.seqrite.com/blog/homoglyph-attacks-lookalike-characters-cyber-deception/</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 06 Apr 2026 04:28:59 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Phishing ] This blog explains the technical mechanics behind homoglyh attacks (Unicode, IDNs, Punycode) and how attackers operationalize these attacks. We also review detection and hunting approaches, real-world usage patterns, MITRE mapping, and practical defences. ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ Matin Tadvi ]]></author>
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<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] vSphere and BRICKSTORM Malware: A Defender's Guide ]]></title>
<link>https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/vsphere-brickstorm-defender-guide/</link>
<guid>https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/vsphere-brickstorm-defender-guide/</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 06 Apr 2026 04:21:33 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Hardening - Virtualization ] This post explores the evolving threats facing virtualized environments such as the BRICKSTORM backdoor, and provides a detailed guide for hardening vSphere Virtual Center and mitigating controls necessary to secure these critical assets. ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ Stuart Carrera ]]></author>
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<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] Container Escape Telemetry - Part 6: TeamPCP and What the Lab Predicted ]]></title>
<link>https://catscrdl.io/blog/containerescapetelemetry/teampcp/</link>
<guid>https://catscrdl.io/blog/containerescapetelemetry/teampcp/</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 06 Apr 2026 04:14:36 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ DevOps - Obfuscation, Evasion & LoL ] A real threat actor is doing exactly what our lab scenarios simulate. Mapping TeamPCP's container escape kill chain against Tetragon, Falco, and Tracee telemetry to answer: would these tools have caught it? ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ Daniel Wyleczuk-Stern ]]></author>
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<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] Container Escape Telemetry, Part 5: Tuning eBPF Tools From Defaults to Detection ]]></title>
<link>https://catscrdl.io/blog/containerescapetelemetry/tuning/</link>
<guid>https://catscrdl.io/blog/containerescapetelemetry/tuning/</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 06 Apr 2026 04:13:58 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ DevOps - Obfuscation, Evasion & LoL ] What Tetragon, Falco, and Tracee ship with out of the box, what you have to build yourself, and every configuration pitfall we hit along the way. The practical tuning guide for container runtime security tools. ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ Daniel Wyleczuk-Stern ]]></author>
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<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] Container Escape Telemetry, Part 4: Volume, Signal-to-Noise, and Choosing a Tool ]]></title>
<link>https://catscrdl.io/blog/containerescapetelemetry/production/</link>
<guid>https://catscrdl.io/blog/containerescapetelemetry/production/</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 06 Apr 2026 04:13:24 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ DevOps - Obfuscation, Evasion & LoL ] How much telemetry do Tetragon, Falco, and Tracee actually generate? Per-scenario volume breakdowns, signal-to-noise analysis, production rate estimates, the Falco rule gap, S15 stress test results, and recommendations by threat model. ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ Daniel Wyleczuk-Stern ]]></author>
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<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] Container Escape Telemetry - Part 3: What Each Tool Actually Captured ]]></title>
<link>https://catscrdl.io/blog/containerescapetelemetry/deepdives/</link>
<guid>https://catscrdl.io/blog/containerescapetelemetry/deepdives/</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 06 Apr 2026 04:12:48 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ DevOps - Obfuscation, Evasion & LoL ] Per-scenario telemetry breakdowns from 15 container escape and stress-test scenarios across Tetragon, Falco, and Tracee. The raw data behind the detection scores, and six patterns every container security deployment should monitor. ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ Daniel Wyleczuk-Stern ]]></author>
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<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] Container Escape Telemetry - Part 2: Methodology and Tool Architecture ]]></title>
<link>https://catscrdl.io/blog/containerescapetelemetry/methodology/</link>
<guid>https://catscrdl.io/blog/containerescapetelemetry/methodology/</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 06 Apr 2026 04:12:00 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ DevOps - Obfuscation, Evasion & LoL ] The lab setup, scenario matrix, and tool comparison framework behind the container escape telemetry research. Three eBPF tools, 15 scenarios, one tool per VM, and a PowerShell harness that ties it all together. ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ Daniel Wyleczuk-Stern ]]></author>
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<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] Container Escape Telemetry - Part 1: Isolation Primitives and the eBPF Observability Model ]]></title>
<link>https://catscrdl.io/blog/containerescapetelemetry/isolation/</link>
<guid>https://catscrdl.io/blog/containerescapetelemetry/isolation/</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 06 Apr 2026 04:10:56 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ DevOps - Obfuscation, Evasion & LoL ] Before you can detect a container escape, you need to understand what's being escaped. This post covers the Linux isolation primitives that containers rely on, why they break, and how eBPF-based security tools observe those breakdowns at the kernel level. ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ Daniel Wyleczuk-Stern ]]></author>
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<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] The BuddyBoss Attack - Part 2: Full Incident Analysis ]]></title>
<link>https://ctrlaltintel.com/research/BuddyBoss-2/</link>
<guid>https://ctrlaltintel.com/research/BuddyBoss-2/</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 06 Apr 2026 04:02:34 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Incident Response & Forensics ] This second part focuses on reconstructing the complete kill-chain of the BuddyBoss Attack . ]]></description>
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<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] The BuddyBoss Attack - Part 1 : Claude's Supply-Chain Attack ]]></title>
<link>https://ctrlaltintel.com/research/BuddyBoss-1/</link>
<guid>https://ctrlaltintel.com/research/BuddyBoss-1/</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 06 Apr 2026 04:01:43 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Incident Response & Forensics ] In this first part we analyze a recovered Claude Code session log that captured a  threat actor directing Claude through the final stage of a supply chain attack: bypassing Cloudflare, uploading backdoored BuddyBoss plugins to the production licensing server, and exploiting victim WordPress sites in real time. ]]></description>
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<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] The Telnyx PyPI Compromise and the 2026 TeamPCP Supply Chain Attacks ]]></title>
<link>https://www.akamai.com/blog/security-research/2026/mar/telnyx-pypi-2026-teampcp-supply-chain-attacks</link>
<guid>https://www.akamai.com/blog/security-research/2026/mar/telnyx-pypi-2026-teampcp-supply-chain-attacks</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 06 Apr 2026 03:54:22 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Incident Response & Forensics - Malware Analysis ] We detail how Telnyx was infected with a malicious payload via a supply chain attack campaign, delve into the malicious payload, and provide mitigation recommendations against this type of attack. ]]></description>
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<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] Velociraptor CLI ]]></title>
<link>https://docs.velociraptor.app/blog/2026/2026-03-21-cli/</link>
<guid>https://docs.velociraptor.app/blog/2026/2026-03-21-cli/</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 06 Apr 2026 03:51:43 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Incident Response & Forensics - Tooling ] This blog post specifically focuses on using Velociraptor’s extensive Command Line Interface mode as a single use tool. This allows users to replace a large number of scripts, and adhoc tools with varying levels of maintainance and different installation dependencies, with a single well maintained and dependable solution.
 ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ Mike Cohen ]]></author>
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<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] Unwind Data Can't Sleep - Introducing InsomniacUnwinding ]]></title>
<link>https://lorenzomeacci.com/unwind-data-cant-sleep-introducing-insomniacunwinding</link>
<guid>https://lorenzomeacci.com/unwind-data-cant-sleep-introducing-insomniacunwinding</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 06 Apr 2026 03:49:09 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Obfuscation, Evasion & LoL ] In this blog we discuss sleep masking in detail, the default assumptions that come with it, and how we are going to break those assumptions with a novel approach called InsomniacUnwinding.
 ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ Lorenzo Meacci ]]></author>
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<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] Site-DOM-XSS using Cookie Injection: The AI Hackers are Coming Faster than You Think ]]></title>
<link>https://medium.com/@renwa/site-dom-xss-using-cookie-injection-the-ai-hackers-are-coming-faster-than-you-think-3ef82f2a991d</link>
<guid>https://medium.com/@renwa/site-dom-xss-using-cookie-injection-the-ai-hackers-are-coming-faster-than-you-think-3ef82f2a991d</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 06 Apr 2026 03:44:50 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Application Security ] We describe how we leveraged AI to quickly uncovered a complex client‑side vulnerability - a DOM‑XSS chain that exploits a malformed cookie‑parsing regex and a TikTok‑analytics cookie injection - to achieve full site takeover. ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ Renwa ]]></author>
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<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] Qilin EDR killer infection chain ]]></title>
<link>https://blog.talosintelligence.com/qilin-edr-killer/</link>
<guid>https://blog.talosintelligence.com/qilin-edr-killer/</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 06 Apr 2026 03:37:29 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Malware Analysis - Obfuscation, Evasion & LoL ] This blog provides an in-depth analysis of the malicious "msimg32.dll" used in Qilin ransomware attacks, which is a multi-stage infection chain targeting EDR systems. We present multiple techniques used by the malware to evade and ultimately disable EDR solutions, including SEH/VEH-based obfuscation, kernel object manipulation, and various API and system call bypass methods. ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ Takahiro Takeda, Holger Unterbrink ]]></author>
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<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] GDDRHammer and GeForge: GPU Rowhammer Now Achieves Full System Compromise ]]></title>
<link>https://blog.barrack.ai/gddrhammer-geforge-gpu-rowhammer-gddr6/</link>
<guid>https://blog.barrack.ai/gddrhammer-geforge-gpu-rowhammer-gddr6/</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 06 Apr 2026 03:35:58 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Exploits & Payloads - Hardware & Bios ] An overview of GDDRHammer and GeForge,  two attacks that demonstrate a full privilege escalation chain: GPU memory corruption to GPU page table hijacking to CPU memory read/write to root shell. ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ Dhayabaran V ]]></author>
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<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] Malicious ML models discovered on Hugging Face platform ]]></title>
<link>https://www.reversinglabs.com/blog/rl-identifies-malware-ml-model-hosted-on-hugging-face</link>
<guid>https://www.reversinglabs.com/blog/rl-identifies-malware-ml-model-hosted-on-hugging-face</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 06 Apr 2026 03:22:11 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Machine Learning & AI - Malwares ] We identified a novel attack technique used on Hugging Face, dubbed nullifAI, abusing Pickle model file serialization to execute arbitrary code while evading existing protections in the AI community for an ML model. ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ Karlo Zanki ]]></author>
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<title><![CDATA[ [TOOL] ICMP Ghost ]]></title>
<link>https://github.com/JM00NJ/ICMP-Ghost-A-Fileless-x64-Assembly-C2-Agent</link>
<guid>https://github.com/JM00NJ/ICMP-Ghost-A-Fileless-x64-Assembly-C2-Agent</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 06 Apr 2026 03:17:23 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ C2 & Exfiltration ] Fileless C2 agent written in pure x64 Assembly for Linux. Features stealth ICMP tunneling, memory-only execution via memfd_create, and terminal-independent daemonization. ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ commSync ]]></author>
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